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THE COMMON MARKET OF THE 
SOUTH (MERCOSUR): 
MODELS AND QUALITATIVE 
MUTATIONS FOR CONSOLIDATING 
AN INTEGRATED ECONOMIC AREA 
PAULO BORBA CASELLA' 
"Since the signing of the Treaty, the common market aspect of 
the MERCOSUR project appears increasingly elusive. '" What 
is likely to emerge by mid-decade, however, is a MERCOSUR 
free trade zone. Many of the necessary steps for establishing 
such a free trade zone have already been taken, and the positive 
results that this process has already engendered ensure that 
progress in this area will continue. "1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary analysts tend to characterize economic integration and the 
consolidation of economic blocs as either as a solution or a threat, 
depending on their geographical position and intellectual perspective. 
* Professor of Law, University of Sao Paulo Law School, Brazil. This paper was prepared in 
2002 as a preliminary report to the Regional Economic Development Committee of the International 
Law Association, which Committee had Professor Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochere as its chair and 
Professor Ryuichi Ida as its rapporteur. I served as co-rapporteur, along with Professors Maurice 
Kamto and Helen Hartnell. 
I. Thomas A. O'Keefe, An Analysis of the MERCOSUR Economic Integration Project from a 
Legal Perspective, 281NT'LLAW. 439, 440 (1994). O'Keefe clearly indicated the key role played by 
economic instability in this context, noting that "Brazil's continuing economic instability makes it 
impossible to implement a goal considered crucial by the Treaty itself, namely coordinated macro-
economic policies among the four member states." Jd. 
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Whether a commentator is located within or outside of a particular bloc, 
there is a common tendency to identify the negative or positive 
consequences of integration in that geographic region, both for the 
countries immediately involved, as well as for world trade as a whole. 
My overarching perspective is that the MERCOSUR integration process 
does not suffer from conceptual vices. However, it contains gaps and 
faces obstacles that stem from implementation flaws. 
Academic and policy debates about economic integration express 
uncertainty regarding the most effective path and methods to construct, 
maintain, and consolidate development. They also question the viability 
of such construction and maintenance, be it through integration, be it for 
economic independence, more or less driven, for the most diverse 
reasons, without intending to reach the final degree of such a model. 
Any country, should it feel inclined towards autarchy, in view of the 
evidence that policies based on the principle of economic self-sufficiency 
are increasingly less viable in the present world, nowadays, will face the 
opposition of concepts so readily evoked as badly situated, usually 
addressed without taking into consideration a specific content or 
dimension. 
Politics - the art of the possible2 - must be oriented by practice. Thus, 
we should not accept theoretical models without first being aware of the 
2. This oft-quoted statement was first made by Bismarck. See Orro FURST VON BISMARCK, 
DIE KUNST DES MOGLICHEN (Uwe Greve ed., 1981). See also Orro FURST VON BISMARCK, 
GEDANKEN UND ERINNERUNGEN (2d ed., 1982). From the mercantilist era, we have inherited a 
large number of consequences, some hidden behind subtly or drastically modified terminology and 
appearances, some even disguised, utilizing nationalistic slogans or calling for the protection of 
"national interest". Vague slogans and easily manipulated political messages become more 
impossible, the more they are to be universally applied. Notwithstanding recommendations intended 
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to serve as panaceas for the economies of indebted 
countries experiencing crisis, it is physically impossible to implement - simultaneously and in a 
growing number of countries - models that encourage exports and restrict imports. Were each 
country indeed to export more and import less, at some point in the not too distant future, the 
mechanism would break down and the system would suffer short of coming to a full stop. If this 
model is no longer viable, a mutation will result. It was precisely the insight into the insufficiency of 
the classic mercantile model that led to the realization that trade treaties - such as the classic 
"friendship, commerce, and navigation" treaties known since the earliest historical records and 
increasingly widespread since the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th 
century - were also inadequate. This understanding paved the way for the emergence of different 
modes and degrees of institutionalizing trade relations, built upon more or less stable bases, under 
more or less institutionalized configurations, yet all of which recognize the need for cooperation 
among States that remain sovereign and autonomous in all other matters. These understandings have 
brought us to our current situation, where setting up an integrated economic area is possible, be it a 
common market, a single market, or even an economic and monetary union. And yet, understanding 
the obsolescence of the Nation State in the face of contemporary challenges, does not sweeten the 
taste of the large number of adjustments that are needed to adapt the existence, role, scope, and 
performance of the State to this new context. New institutional, economic and political 
configurations are needed, if the objective of building and maintaining a homogeneous economically 
2
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implementation requirements and adjustments that can be expected to 
follow therefrom. This interaction will inevitably come to light, and is 
both healthy and necessary. It is not viable simply to replicate models in 
different contexts, but nor should we ignore the existence of conceptual 
similarities and requirements in different geographical and historical 
contexts. Experimentation will allow for the assessment of positive 
results, and thus for the sharing of common experiences. When a new 
attempt is made at economic integration in an Inter-American sub-
regional context, we must begin by drawing lessons from our own past. 
Our flrst step must therefore be to refrain from repeating past mistakes, 
as suggested by the rhetorical inheritance of the LAFf A-LAIA model. 
Second, we must determine the extent to which we can borrow from 
other integration experiences, such as that of the European Union (EU), 
notwithstanding the existence of significant conceptual and contextual 
differences. 
In regard to integration, it is particularly important that a fair balance be 
achieved between theory and practice, a synthesis of doctrinaire 
approaches and concrete experiences. In the Inter-American integration 
process, Vacchin03 among others has stressed the need to avoid both 
extremes: extreme empiricism that rejects any and every theoretical 
abstract statement, and rejection of experimentation in the name of 
abstract models, without regard for whether they can be adjusted to flt 
reality. The happy medium is hard to reach in practice and must be done 
<?n a case-by-case basis. 
These difficulties are compounded by a dilemma. On the one hand, it is 
not possible to solve every problem before starting implementation. Yet 
on the other hand, integration cannot be implemented without flrst 
having defined its parameters. The evident variation in models and paths 
illustrates the vital relevance to the success of integration of factors that 
go beyond strictly economic and legal ones, notably the key role of 
political will, its stability and capacity to reflect national interest. 
integrated area is to be achieved. Technical matters must be reckoned with, as well as the capacity 
to accept the necessary changes. Models differ in regard to their capacity to react and adapt to the 
latest needs presented by the international economic context. We must evaluate different types of 
economic areas according to the level of political keenness, as well as the firmness and flexibility 
needed to ensure proper implementation. 
3. See JUAN MARIO V ACCHINO, iNTEGRACI6N EcON6MICA REGIONAL (1981); INTEGRACI6N 
LATINOAMERICANA: DE LA ALALC A LA ALADI (1983). See also Juan Mario Vacchino, El 
Proceso de lntegraci6n Econ6mica en America Latina: Enfoques Doctrinarios y Experiencias 
Concretas, OEAlCJI, XII CURSO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL (1986); LA DIMENSI6N 
P ARLAMENT ARIA DE LOS PROCESOS DE iNTEGRACI6N REGIONAL (810-INT AL) (1990). 
3
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Since political will is both volatile and voluble, stability must be 
constructed through the institutionalization of processes and mechanisms 
to safeguard it from individual whims and the interests that may prevail 
at a specific moment in time. This makes possible the continuity of the 
institutional system, both towards the internal legal order, and also 
towards the mechanisms for institutionalizing and making integration 
viable. 
The oscillation between expectations and uncertamtles can be 
debilitating. Argentina and Brazil, for example, are marked by so many 
and such serious contrasts and inequalities, problems and injustice, that it 
is nearly impossible to assign mid- and long-term projects to people, 
parties or national administration organs. Paraguay and Uruguay, on the 
other hand, can state their respective claims and wishes, but both remain 
not crucial to ensure per se the outcome of the MERCOSUR regional 
integration process.4 The disruption does not even depend on expiring 
mandates, but results from regrettable (but predictable) changes of 
people or associations, simply changing directions of the wind, which 
leaves efforts discontinued halfway through. This imposes well-known 
costs and wear and tear on individuals and on nations, and renders them 
less likely to be motivated or confident when future occasions arise. The 
present condition of Argentine finance and exchange only exacerbates 
the current uncertainty. While political consistency has been a rare 
virtue lately in Brazil among other countries, excessive consistency is 
drowning Argentina in bankruptcy. 
These circumstances help us to evaluate more clearly the current project 
to construct a Common Market of the South - MERCOSUR. This 
project seems to be in jeopardy, not least by the lack of an institutional 
structure. At the same time, however, it is being attached to new efforts 
of an uncertain configuration and even more remote chances of viable 
implementation. For example, MERCOSUR has been linked to 
discussions of the so-called Amazon Initiative, as well as in connection 
with discussions about another incarnation of the LAFT A-LAIA5 pattern, 
i.e., the South American Free Trade Association ("SAFT A"). As early 
as 1994, the Brazilian government proposed negotiations between 
4. MERCOSUR was established pursuant to the Treaty of Asuncion, done on 26 March 1991. 
5. LAFfA, which refers to the Latin America Free Trade Association, was established in 
1960 by the Treaty of Montevideo, for the purpose of removing trade barriers among the Member 
States over the course of a 12-year transition period. By the late I 970s, the 11 signatories undertook 
to restructure LAFf A. These efforts resulted in the 1980 Treaty of Montevideo, which established 
LAIA - the Latin America Integration Association - was set up as the successor to LAFTA. The 
current LAIA members are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The Spanish acronyms for LAFTA and LAIA are ALALC and 
ALADI, respectively. 
4
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MERCOSUR countries and the Andean Community, that were to end by 
1999 and lead to the establishment of a free trade area as of 1 January 
2000. With the benefit of hindsight, we recognize that this ambitious 
task was unrealistic, if not altogether impossible, and has been 
abandoned. 
This is not to say that the objective of creating SAFf A has been entirely 
abandoned. Indeed, it might eventually be implemented, within the next 
decade. But this project would not escape the central problems that 
plague MERCOSUR. My concerns do not go to the viability of the 
project, but rather to the insufficient institutional framework and the 
failure to implement the measures already agreed. This remains true, if 
not yet immediately feasible. 
In my view, the MERCOSUR integration process is and remains valid. 
It does not suffer from a priori conceptual vices, but suffers instead from 
the gaps and obstacles that result from flawed implementation. The 
result is not only ineffective, but also counterproductive, inso~ar as it 
substitutes this project for others, even less clearly configured. Taking a 
long-term view, integration is closely related to the adoption of models 
that are stable and viable in the long run, but also ensure that national 
interests are adequately promoted and protected. A pragmatic approach 
is essential. Rather than seeking to ascertain the undeniable validity and 
applicability of one or another theoretical conception of integration, we 
should insist that all actions required by the adopted line of action -
whether intergovernmental or supranational - be taken in order to pursuit 
of the objective of organizing the economic area. Once it has been 
launched, an initiative should be carried out, which makes the political 
will to do so next in importance to the integration model that has been 
selected. 
These considerations suggest that we cannot really expect successful 
construction of a viable and lasting economic area unless and until the 
two fundamental prerequisites are satisfied: selection of a proper model 
to organize the economic area, and sufficient political will (guided by 
national interest) to ensure adequate implementation. Discussions about 
integration cannot afford to ignore or leave aside the crucial matter of 
adopting mechanisms to ensure implementation. These prerequisites 
need not be completely synchronous, but both must exist to some extent, 
if the task of integration is to succeed. 
Another feature that seriously jeopardizes the stability and viability of an 
integration process, together with the durability of its results, is the 
extent to which automatically applicable exit mechanisms apply. Brazil, 
5
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for its part, aims to become a regional power, to ensure its independence 
while internationally inserting itself in an adequate and competitive 
manner. 6 Brazil's hesitation and apprehension are understandable, since 
the costs and benefits involved in any integration process need to be 
balanced. The exit mechanism is the necessary price to be paid. Brazil 
commits itself to the stability of the entire process, but only to the extent 
it is possible to reach for the exit door at any time. 
The crucial question for Brazil is, what is the best way to ensure effective 
integration, given (as previously argued) that this is the best way to foster 
national interest? The protection and fulfillment of national interest is 
the flag that everyone waves, the cause that everyone embraces, yet no 
one cares to describe. While we can make a plea for good sense and 
conscience from each person individually, we must also attend to history, 
and seek national examples where possible.7 
While it is not possible to resolve here the acrimonious and interminable 
debates over how to ascertain the national interest, it is necessary to 
address the issue in the context of economic integration. A.C.R. de 
Andrade set the parameters for the debate over interests when he 
observed, in his 24 April 1840 speech in Parliament, that "[n]ot everyone 
ignores the divisions of interests; there are private interests, there are 
interests of the great masses, there are interests among professionals, 
there are interests between the power that rules and the subjects that 
obey, there are interests between the nation and the foreign nations."8 
6. This may be premature, if undertaken before having properly solved basic problems 
pertaining to its social, political and economic internal structure. 
7. Antonio Paim, Significado da Nor;iio de Interesse para os liberais Brasileiros 9 (1995). 
During the first two decades after Brazil's independence in 1822, thinkers and politicians had the 
vision to discern, out of the bleak framework of absolutist monarchy, the fundamentals of 
democratic representation. This has allowed us to enjoy the longest period of institutional and 
political stability in the history of Brazil. "In that dramatic context of the first two decades of 
independence, the doctrine diffused by S. Ferreira (1769-1846), and the pre-eminence it reached 
within the new elite in formation, would be the key for the success subsequently achieved in the 
conception and implementation of the institutions of the representative system. Correspondingly the 
abandoning of that doctrine during the Republic is closely related to the fact that we were not able to 
organize political parties and adopt apt electoral mechanisms to ensure the representation of the 
system." /d. Paim also recalled "that significant work, a cornerstone of liberalism" -- the Citizen's 
Handbook for a Representative Government that was written and published in Paris in three volumes 
in 1834. See Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira, Manual do Cidadiio ern urn Govemo Representativo, in 
IDEIAS POLITICAS (PUC-CFC, Documentiirio, 1976). See also S.P. FERREIRA, PRELE<;OES 
FIws6FICAS (2nd ed. 1970); VICENTE BARRETIO, A IDEOWGIA LIBERAL NO PROCESSO DA 
INDEPENDENCIA DO BRASIL (1972). 
8. A.c.R. DE ANDRADE, GRANDES DISCURSOS 5-16 (Walter Costa Porto ed., Funda<;ao 
Tancredo Neves, 1988). He spoke in the context of a debate between the Senate and the House of 
Representatives over budgetary power. His conclusion that the Senate was "not within its 
jurisdiction to modify the budget drawn up by the House of Representatives" was based on his 
estimation of "the nature of the representative system, on the nature of taxes, on the interests 
6
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Although the dividing lines are not as clear as we might want them to be, 
we need not share the full measure of skepticism expressed by von 
Mises, for whom "political events are the inevitable consequence of the 
change of economic policies."9 He continues: 
The ideas that guided statesmen, philosophers and legal scholars 
which, in the 18th century and beginning of the 19th, elaborated 
the basis of the new political system, stemmed from the 
presupposition that, in a nation, all honest citizens share the same 
final goal. This final goal which all decent men were to pursue 
is the well-being of the entire nation, as well as the well-being of 
the other nations. Those moral and political leaders were, 
therefore, firmly convinced that a free nation is not interested in 
conquest. They judged partisan politics as something simply 
natural, since it seemed totally normal to them the existence of 
different opinions in relation to the best way of guiding the 
affairs of the state .... [T]he statesman of the 18th century 
thought that the legislators had specific ideas on common well-
being. Nowadays, however, is manifest, in the reality of political 
life - basically in that of all the countries in the world where a 
communist dictatorship does not rule (1958) - a situation where 
authentic political parties no longer exist, in the old classic sense 
of the word, but merely pressure groupS.lO 
We can share von Mises' brilliant insight that "man is not a being that 
has, on the one side, an economic dimension, and on the other, a political 
one, separated one from the other. In reality, that which is commonly 
denominated deterioration of freedom, constitutional government, and 
representative institutions, is nothing but the consequence of the radical 
change of political and economic ideas." II 
Substituting the action of pressure groups for the genuine search for 
national interest distorts the performance of political representation and 
jeopardizes the legitimacy of the entire system. The very determination 
of what is the national interest and which is the most efficient means to 
represented by the three parts that represent the general interests and besides this on the 
Constitution." [d. 
9. Ludwig von Mises, Economic Policy: Thoughts for Today and Tomorrow, in As SEIS 
LI(OES 86-98 (Maria Luiza X. de A. Borges transl., Jose Olympio/Instituto Liberal, 2nd ed., 1986). 
10. [d. He offers the following definitions: "A pressure group is a group of people eager to 
obtain a privilege at expense of the rest of the nation. This privilege could consist of a tariff on 
competitive imports; it could be laws that restrain competition. However it may be, it grants a 
special position to the members of a group. It gives them something which is denied, or should be 
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obtain it remains vague. The discrepancy between official priorities and 
hesitation, behind the arrogant and optimistic sermons, mirrors the lack 
of definition of the paths to follow in a world that is increasingly divided 
into trading blocs. Brazil faces a choice between, on the one hand, 
independence and, on the other, co-operation or integration strategies. 12 
II. MODELS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
MERCOSUR's adoption of the term common market to designate its 
integration project immediately raises a question about the 
appropriateness of the model that term implicitly invokes. Since this is 
not the place to review extensively the leading literature on the theory of 
economic integration,13 let it suffice to say that there is a gradual 
procession that can be followed, in terms of the forms and requirements 
imposed upon the participants, when pursuing economic co-operation 
and integration. The free trade area is the least complex modality of 
economic integration, which implies the elimination of tariff or 
quantitative barriers among the members. A customs union, on the other 
hand, aggregates to the free trade area model a uniform system, 
combining a common regime for rules of origin 14 and a common external 
tariff (CET), that is imposed upon imports coming from third countries. 
A common market moves beyond a customs union by adding the free 
flow of the main factors of economic production - encompassing people 
and services, goods and capital - and a certain indispensable degree of 
co-ordination and harmonization of national economic policies. 
Economic and monetary union represents an even more ample kind of 
economic integration, constituting an organically integrated whole. An 
12. VERA THORSTENSEN, YOSHIAKI NAKANO, CAMILA DE FARIA LIMA & CLAUDIO SEUI 
SATO (EDS), 0 BRASIL FRENTE A UM MUNDO DIVIDIDO EM BLOCOS (Nobel, 1994); JosE ANGELO 
ESTRELLA FARIA, 0 MERCOSUL: PRINCiPIOS, FINALIDADE E ALCANCE DO TRATADO DE 
ASSUN<;AO (MRFlSGIElNAT, 1993); JAIME CESAR LIPOVETZKY & DANIEL ANDRES LIPOVETZKY, 
MERCOSVL: ESTRATEGIAS PARA A INTEGRA<;AOI MERCOSUR: ESTRATEGIAS PARA LA 
INTEGRACI6N I MERCADO COMUM OU ZONA DE LIVRE COMERCIO I ANALISES E PERSPECTN AS DO 
TRATADO DE ASSUN<;AO (LTr ed., 1994); Jose Eduardo Faria, Integrafiio e po/{tica: 0 Brasil no 
MERCOSUL, in DIREITO E COMERCIO INTERNACIONAL; TENDENCIAS E PERSPECTIVAS 478-496 
(LTr Ed., 1994). 
13. Albeit subject to controversy, the classic doctrine in matters of economic integration theory 
includes the fOllowing: B. BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (Allen & Unwin, 
1962); C. CARRARO ET AL. (EDS), INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY CO-ORDINATION (Basil 
Blackwell Ltd., 1991); G. LIPSEY, THE THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS: A GENERAL EQUILffiRIUM 
ANALYSIS (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1970); P. MAILLET & PH. ROLLET, iNTEGRATION 
ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE: THEORIE ET PRATIQUE (Nathan, 1991); W. Ropke, Economic Order 
and International Law, RCADI, 1954-11, vol. 86, pp. 203-273, T. SCrrOVSKY, ECONOMIC THEORY 
AND WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (Allen & Unwin, 1958); J. VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION 
ISSUE (Carnegie, 1950). 
14. MARTHA LUCIA OLIVAR-JIMENEZ, VANESSA CALEFFI & DANIELA BENJAMIN, 0 REGIME 
COMUM DE ORJGEM NO MERCOSUL (Brasflia, SenadO/ABEI, Estudos da Integra~ao, vol. 3, 1993). 
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economic and monetary union surpasses a common market insofar as it 
substitutes for national economic policies a host of common policies, 
including but not limited to currency, common administration and 
budgets. Thus, for example, an economic and monetary union could 
provide the foundation for a political union, in which, to all the elements 
of economic and institutional character already mentioned, a political 
model is added, under the denomination of confederation or federation of 
States. 
Even leaving aside the rhetoric for or against integration, MERCOSUR's 
choice of the common market model invokes a very concrete idea. A 
common market refers to a wide array of specific requirements, whose 
content and unfolding must be known and applied, to avoid running the 
risk of deflating the scope of the theoretically adopted model. Though 
some results may be obtained, and even some progress may be made 
towards economic co-operation, this does not in and of itself suffice to 
construct a common market. 
The Party States of MERCOSUR committee themselves, since the end of 
the transition period on 31 December 1994, to build a common market on 
the basis of reciprocity and in accordance with the provisions of the 1991 
Treaty of Asuncion. Yet MERCOSUR seems to be running just the risk 
identified above, that is, of stopping short of fulfilling all the potential of 
that Treaty and living up to the chosen theoretical model of common 
market. According to Article I of the Treaty of Asuncion, the Party 
States are obligated to provide for the following: 
• free movement of goods, services and other factors of 
production, inter alia through elimination of custom duties and 
non-custom restrictions on the flow of goods, as well as any 
other measures having equivalent effect; 
• the establishment of a common external tariff and the 
adoption of a common trade policy in regard to third States or 
groups of States, together with the co-ordination of positions in 
regional and international economic fora; 
• the coordination of macro-economic and sectoral policies 
among Party States - in the fields of foreign trade, agriculture, 
industry, taxation, monetary, exchange and capital, services, 
customs, transport, communications, and others that may be 
agreed upon - in order to ensure adequate conditions for 
competition among the Party States; and 
9
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• a commitment to harmonize Party State legislation, in the 
relevant areas, in order to achieve and strengthen the integration 
process.15 
In order to understand fully the common market concept in the context of 
MERCOSUR, we must consider the 1957 Treaty Establishing the 
European Economic Community, as amended, which founded and still 
provides the legal basis for the European Community (EC).16 This 
provides a baseline against which we can determine the content and 
objectives of MERCOSUR. While some native rhetoric insists on the 
unique features of Inter-American integration, it is unwise to ignore the 
similarities between MERCOSUR and the EC, insofar as they exist, or to 
deny the fact that much has been borrowed, more or less directly, from 
the European model. The fact of borrowing is amply illustrated by a 
careful comparison between the objectives of the 1991 Treaty of 
Asuncion and the Rome Treaty. . 
The EC Treaty, much like the later Treaty of Asuncion, calls for 
establishing a common market and forging a closer co-ordination of 
economic policies. This serves to remind us of the importance of 
considering the connection between the economic bases and the legal 
concepts employed to achieve particular ends. The consolidated base of 
a common market is considered to be an essential and complementary 
stage, a different and more advanced stage of the European construction 
emerged, aimed at the creation of an economic and monetary union. 
Article 3 of the EC Treaty offers a benchmark for ascertaining the 
content and objectives of the common market. This functional 
definition l ? presents the common market as a common economic area 
among the Member States that constitute the European Community (and 
. now also the European Union or EU). This economic area exists in order 
that economic agents can act freely, can exercise the rights conferred on 
15. Article I, Treaty of Asunci6n. 
16. The 1957 Treaty, best known as the Rome Treaty, has been amended many times in the 
past decades, most recently by the Nice Treaty, which took effect in February 2003. References to 
pre-Maastricht treaty language -- Le., to versions of the Rome Treaty that preceded the significant 
changes introduced by the Treaty on European Union, or TEU, which was concluded in 1992 and 
entered into effect in 1994 -- will be to the ROME TREATY. All other references in this article will be 
to the current and consolidated version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, which 
shall be designated "EC TREATY" in order to mark this distinction. 
17. ALFONSO MATIERA, LE MARCHE UNIQUE EUROPEEN: SES REGLES, SON 
FONCTIONNEMENT 12-15 (2d ed. 1990) (referring to EC TREATY, articles 2, 3 & 4). See also E. 
Piontek, European Integration and International Law of Economic Interdependence, 9-125 RCADI, 
1992-V, vol. 236; E. Piontek, The Principles of Equality and Reciprocity in International Economic 
Law: Mere Concepts or Legal Reality?, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW AND DEVELOPING 
STATES: SOME ASPECTS 79-111 (Fox ed., 1988). 
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them by the Treaty itself (or by measures based on the Treaty's 
provisions), and can exercise the EC's four fundamental freedoms (i.e., 
free flow of goods, people, services and capital). 
The European common market aims not only at abolishing barriers to the 
free exercise of such liberties (e.g., customs and physical barriers to 
movement, state subsidies affecting affect trade, etc.), but also at 
abolishing restrictive practices that divide markets or otherwise interfere 
with economic integration. In this regard, the EC's common market 
moves beyond mere liberalization of trade within the integrated 
economic area, and pursues larger goals intended to further the 
integration process. Thus, for example, the EC prohibits anti-
competitive practices adopted by companies that might undermine 
liberalization, and aims to formulate common policies and harmonized 
regulations in a wide range of economic, social and other sectors. The 
ultimate goal is to reach the stage where the flow of goods, capital, 
services and capital among the EU Member States is similar to that 
which takes place within the confines of a national territory. The 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has observed that "the notion of a 
common market ... aims at the elimination of all obstacles to intra-
regional trade, aiming at uniting the national markets into a single 
market, equivalent, as close as well as possible to the conditions of a real 
internal market. "18 
To the extent that the common market has been progressively established 
and organized, new common policies have become indispensable to 
ensure its adequate performance. These policies have gradually 
expanded over time, covering fields ranging from the environment to 
culture, from energy to the latest technology, and from social to regional 
dimensions of integration, not to mention external policy.19 
From the 1986 Single European Act, to the 1992 Treaty on European 
Union, the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and the 2000 Nice Treaty, the 
common market notion has been upgraded to the notion of a single 
market. The single market implies the elimination of any kind of 
obstacle to the free exercise of its fundamental liberties, though it still 
18. Case 15/81, Schul v. Invoerrechten, 1982 ECR 1409, 3 C.M.L.R. 229 (1982); see also 
MATIERA, supra note 17, at 12-13. 
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permits the maintenance of internal borders, although relaxed in regard 
to their structure and prerogatives.2° 
The central importance of economic aspects is unquestionable in the 
construction of an integration process. And yet the overall success of the 
integration process will depend precisely on the extent to which, 
subsequent to the establishment of a homogeneous and integrated 
economic area, the process began can be continued, as in the EU. The 
European integration model suggests the key role of legal connections in 
consolidating economic integration, and illustrates how political 
inclination both completes and augments the scope of the task. 
Obviously the EU experience does not offer perfect parameters for 
MERCOSUR in this latter sense. 
Nothing obliges us to adopt foreign models in the Inter-American 
context. And yet, insofar as similarities exist in the guiding principles, 
we cannot neglect the indispensable mechanisms of implementation that 
are needed to make such abstractfonnulae become a reality. Precisely to 
the extent that a consolidation of an economic integrated area takes 
place, through the adoption of a model, it will make subsequent 
qualitative changes, from the full implementation of successive levels of 
econoimc integration. It is wise to remember the key role played by 
successful customs unions in the process of state formation, as in the 
case of Germany (Zollverein) and Italy .. 
Yet we cannot jump too quickly from economic to political integration. 
National identity can be very closely connected to external affairs, in the 
sense of a reaction against external threats or other perceived need to 
take a stand in relation to foreign affairs. Indeed, such occasions often 
aid a national identity to "find itself' and propel the political unification 
process leading up to the consolidation of a new state. Such "identity" 
cannot be "found" except as an urge or ideal to be constructed in cases 
such as the European Community or, to a lesser degree, in the case of 
BENELUX. In the context of Inter-American integration, absent a 
national identity, some efforts have been made to establish a 
supranational conception. These efforts are more fragile, or at least more 
theoretical and tenuous than the invocation of the notion of a 
motherland, which reaches from political discourse into the heart of the 
average citizen. This is why Inter-American the integration process 
20. MATIERA, supra note 17, at 15 ("Le marche unique de 1993 sera donc un espace 
authentiquement unifie, parce que desonnais definitivement affranchi des douanes interieures qui 
divisent les pays de la Communaute et des 'servitudes' techniques, fiscales, physiques, monetaires 
qu'e\les ont pour tache de faire respecter."). 
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places the primary emphasis on economic aspects. There are good 
prospects of building consensus around the idea of economic integration, 
of bringing together the most able team, of grouping common vital 
economic and strategic interests, submitting them to unified management 
disciplined by shared norms, within an institutionally and legally 
harmonious environment. 
The weakness of concepts such as supranational, international or 
transnational is evident, except for a small intellectual minority 
permeated by humanistic conceptions, where similarities are observed 
among human beings, besides and beyond the neighborhood gossip or 
the faithful followers of a football team, to others more concrete, but not 
necessarily easier to overcome, of identity, culture or national language 
and State sovereignty, from the protection of the identity to a 
nationalistic and xenophobic vision of natural interests. 
Referring once again to the European experience, the ongoing adaptation 
of the model to current needs is evidenced by the way that the European 
rejection of direct political unification proposals in the 1950s, led to the 
adoption of the indirect economic path towards achieving those same 
objectives. Once the key pieces of economic unification were in place, at 
least technically by the end of the transition period (1958-1968), 
discussions could - and in 1972 did - return to the topic of political 
union. This process inaugurated a steady progression of treaty revisions 
that have moved Europe towards that "ever closer union" proclaimed in 
the opening lines of the EC Treaty as the overarching goal of integration. 
These examples show that the fundamental urge remains, even if 
manifested through apparently diversified phenomena. It is evident that 
there is still a lot to be done to reach the definite political structure of the 
European Union. The EU is adept at visualizing the aspects already 
taken into account, more than going beyond the possible unfolding, in 
the sense of being able to, in a not so distant future, have solidly 
established an economic and monetary union, with its internal 
dimensions, in social as well as external matters, including defense and 
common external policies. 
The EU's integration process has been achieved (and continues to move 
forward) by using the economic aspect as the main propeller of 
integration. It was the construction of an economically integrated area 
that allowed the process of perfectibility of the models and their 
qualitative mutations. However, precisely from (or together with) this 
economic aspect is the key that gives the integration process its 
continuity, i.e., through the adoption of common norms and institutions. 
13
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It is instructive to track the progressive establishment of "ever closer 
union" among the peoples of Europe, and to notice the extent to which 
integration has gradually encompassed aspects that move further and 
further from strictly economic matters. Recent years have seen 
increasing emphasis on the human side and on the social dimensions of 
integration. The Treaty of European Union (1992) and the Amsterdam 
Treaty (1997) broadened the EU's mandate to pursue sustainable 
development and social rights, in the context of building an area without 
internal borders. Key issues on the EU's current agenda include: 
reinforcing economic and social cohesion; establishing economic and 
monetary union; confirming a common European identity in the 
international scene, through the execution of a common foreign and 
security policy, including the progressive framing of a common defence 
policy; reinforcing the national rights and interests of the Member States 
through the institution of Union citizenship; developing close judicial co-
operation; maintaining and developing the entire communitarian 
achievement (i.e., the so-called acquis communautaire); and reviewing 
policies and forms of co-operation, with the objective of guaranteeing the 
efficiency of the mechanisms and institutions of the Community. 
It bears mention that EU Member States pursue all these activities (and 
many others) while simultaneously observing the principle of 
subsidiarity, which limits the activities of Community institutions in 
accordance with the parameters established by Article 5 of the EC 
Treaty. Within the areas of its exclusive competence, the Community 
may act "only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action 
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, 
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community."21 Community action is further constrained 
by the requirement that "[a]ny action by the Community shall not go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives" of the EC Treaty.22 
These limitations show that fears are exaggerated about the difficulty of 
maintaining national sovereignty in the context of economic integration. 
It is not until political union has been attained that Member States stand 
to lose their status as subjects of international law. Yet, as the 
experience of federal states shows, even extensive integration still leaves 
untouched areas within the exclusive competence of the States, even 
though other vital matters are managed in an integrated manner. 
'4 
Qualitative changes are taking place in Europe, where progressive 
integration gradually transcends mere economic aspects, even though 
21. EC TREATY, article 5. 
22. EC TREATY, article 5. 
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economic integration has played, and continues to play a fundamental 
role. The corresponding institutional adjustments include not only the 
widely discussed economic and monetary union that is now underway, 
but also innovations in fields such as Union citizenship and the 
constitutional obligation to observe respect for human rights and 
fundamental liberties, in accordance with Article 6 of the Treaty on 
European Union, which incorporates safeguards on the rights of man and 
fundamental liberties to the EU's legal order.23 
The EU's institutional evolution is well along the path of integration and, 
notwithstanding occasional setbacks, may in many aspects be considered 
irreversible. The most interesting aspect of the EU's experience in 
consolidating an economic integrated area and achieving qualitative 
change, from the legal point of view that is my focus, is the role played 
by Community law and institutions in the formation of European 
identity. Though this is not the time or place to reopen the question of 
European identity,24 it is important to note the role and scope of legal 
questions that have surfaced in connection with the consolidation of an 
economic integrated area. 
The entire integration process, both logically and inevitably, is not a one-
way street, nor is it free from controversy. This means that antagonistic 
forces pointing in opposing directions will come to face each other: on 
the one side, the political and monetary union, perhaps based on a federal 
model, and on the other, a decentralized vision, perhaps structured as a 
Europe of regions. Paradoxically, either one of these two forces, taken 
to its logical conclusion, would reduce the meaning of that integrated 
entity which, in international law as well as in people's conscience, has 
for a long time been the organizing focus of the European identity -- the 
Nation State.25 P. Villard and J. Charpentier share this point of view, 
both in regard to its geographical scope, as well as its political structure.26 
23. Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union provides that the "Union shall respect 
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law." 
See generally COMUNIDADE EUROPEIA, supra note 19, at 592-604. 
24. This question has been a burning topic for at least six hundred years. See generally JOHN 
HALE, THE CIVILIZATION OF EUROPE IN THE RENAISSANCE (1994); FERNAND BRAUDEL, 
CIVILIZATION & CAPITALISM 15TH-18TH CENTURY (Sian Reynolds trans!., 1984). See also 
COMUNIDADEEUROPEIA, supra note 19, at 49-197. 
25. Bernard S. Jackson, Legal Visions of the New Europe: Ius Gentium, Ius Commune, 
European Law, in LEGAL VISIONS OF THE NEW EUROPE 3-35 (Jackson & McGoldrick eds., 1993). 
26. Pierre Villard, Etat, Nation, Region: Observations sur I 'unite des Etats Europeens Depuis 
Deux Siecles, VRBEL vol. 305 (Saarbriicken, 1994); Jean Charpentier, La Notion d'Etat Ii la 
Lumiere des Transformations de la Societe Intemationale, VRBEL vol. 305 (Saarbriicken, 1994), 
available at http://eirewi.jura.uni-sb.deleuinlschriftlindex.htrnl. 
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Notwithstanding the economic and institutional progress, a European 
law science still, to a large extent, remains to be created, as Carl Schmitt 
pointed out in 1944-45.27 
It is possible to efficient results, on the American continent as well as in 
other sub-regional groupings, by starting with economic integration and 
using similar patterns. Yet the success of such efforts ultimately depends 
on the strength of the involved countries' commitment to overcome 
backward and limited conceptions, such as State independence and 
sovereignty, and to elaborate a vision in which similarities can prevail 
over the differences. Success will depend on rejecting short-term views 
and partisan approaches, as well as rejecting market protection and 
mental bias, such as that paradoxically illustrated by the nationalism-
sovereignty dyad. The real dimension of patriotism, the pursuit of the 
higher interests of the motherland, calls upon us to have the courage to 
start something new and effective with our MERCOSUR partners. 
The extent to which we are able to accomplish this, together with the 
ability of managing institutional problems and social as well as regional 
inequalities, while also keeping a close eye on the democratic parameters 
of performance, will be the test by which future generations evaluate us. 
They will justified to ask whether, with the passage of time, we have 
managed to visualize and to build something new, or whether we simply 
repeated loud but hollow concepts, whether we proclaimed grand 
solidarity and community interests, while simultaneously failing to 
provide for their efficient implementation. 
Keeping in mind the present characterization of political will, as going 
beyond economic and legal aspects, the full analysis of its configuration 
is beyond the scope of this work, which limits itself to examining the 
requirements and perspectives for MERCOSUR, from a Brazilian 
perspective. While mindful of the multiple unfoldings and interesting 
repercussions of the Inter-American integration process, that was 
unleashed in the past and is now steered by the 1991 Treaty of Asuncion, 
we cannot deny a certain sense of frustration. The possibility of 
achieving a real common market, as illustrated by the 1994 Ouro Preto 
Protocol, seems increasingly elusive. Does this mean that it is not even 
possible to achieve a/ree trade area among the Southern Cone countries 
in the coming years, supported by ample legal, financial, economic and 
political changes in the region? This may be the implication of 
27. Carl Schmitt, La SituaJion de la Science Europeenne du Droit, in 14 L'EUROPE ET LE 
DROIT 115-140 (Michel Scalici transl., Revue Fran .. aise de Theorie Juridique, 1991). 
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Samtleben's and Salomao's description of "the MERCOSUR Treaty as a 
project."28 
The MERCOSUR project, right from the start, in the terms of the 6 July 
1990 Buenos Aires Act, aimed to create a Brazil-Argentina Common 
Market by 1995,29 which was incorporated to the pre-existing LAIA 
agreements, in accordance with the terms of the 14/90 Economic 
Complementary Agreement.3o Uruguay and Paraguay decided to join, 
due to reasonable fears that they would otherwise be excluded from the 
markets of their two main commercial partners, which led to the 1991 
Treaty of Asuncion. The 1991 Treaty, which was ratified by all four 
national Parliaments, was also incorporated to the pre-existing LAIA 
agreements, in accordance with the terms of the 18/91 Economic 
Complementary Agreement.31 
To wonder why the common market model was chosen, whose evolution 
is confirming the remote possibility of being reached, at least in the 
phase in course at the moment, is as questionable as useless. The project 
is turning out to be too ambitious and beyond the political and 
institutional reach that leaders are able to handle under current 
conditions. We can only hope that by the end of the second convergence 
period for implementation of the common external tariff in 2005, that a 
more adequate and stable institutional structure can be put into place, in 
order to guide and support the integration process. 
III. CONCLUSION 
Beautiful speeches, hollow in content and deprived of practical 
consequences, have been familiar to us for decades, with small 
modifications in form and nothing new in terms of content. It remains to 
be seen whether we can build something that is useful and lasting in 
terms of integration, whether we are really prepared and willing to follow 
such a path, and whether we can lead ourselves towards an efficient 
common market. 
We cherish the hope, for better or worse, that it is possible to consolidate 
an integrated economic area, despite the lack of vision and functionality 
28. Jiirgen Samtleben & Calixto Salomao Filho, 0 Mercado Comum Sul-Americano: Uma 
Analise Juridica do MERCOSUL, in CONTRATOS lNTERNACIONAIS 239-277 (Joao G. Rodas ed., 2d 
ed. 1995). That article is a translated and updated version of Der Siidamerikanische Gemeinsame 
Markt: eine rechtliche Analyse der MERCOSUR (1992) WERTPAPIER MITTEILUNGEN 1345-1385 
(referring to the Asunci6n Treaty as an "Entwurf' or draft or project). 
29. Act of Buenos Aires, 6 July 1990, in 15 lNTEGRACI6N LATINOAMERICANA 67 (1990). 
30. Acordo de Complementa~ao Econ6mica (ACE) n. 14 (ALADI, signed in December 1990). 
31. Acordo de Complementa~ao Econ6mica (ACE) n. 18 (ALADI, signed in November 1991). 
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of the holders of power. Private sector initiative is slowly making come 
true that which, for decades, government officials have repeated in the 
abstract. 
I would like to conclude by sounding an optimistic note about what can 
be accomplished, despite the lack of action and vision at the 
governmental level. Keeping the Brazilian case in mind, the words of 
Thomas B. Macaulay on social history ring out from the past, even 
though we must take his optimistic vision with a grain of salt: 
In every experimental science there is a tendency towards 
perfection. In every human being, there is a wish to ameliorate 
his own condition. These two principles have often sufficed, 
even when counteracted by great public calamities and by bad 
institutions, to carry civilization rapidly forward. No ordinary 
misfortune, no ordinary misgovernment, will do so much to 
make a nation wretched, as the constant progress of physical 
knowledge and the constant effort of every man to better himself 
will do to make a nation prosperous. It has often been found that 
profuse expenditure, heavy taxation, absurd commercial 
restnctlOns, corrupt tribunals, disastrous wars, seditions, 
persecutions, conflagrations, inundations, have not been able to 
destroy capital so fast as the exertions of private citizens have 
been able to create it. It can be easily proved that, in our own 
land, the national wealth has, during at least six centuries, been 
almost uninterruptedly increasing . .. This progress, having 
continued during many ages, became at length about the middle 
of the eighteenth century, portentously rapid, and has proceeded, 
during the nineteenth, with accelerated velocity.32 
I believe that we can draw a parallel between Macaulay's passage and 
the current state of regional integration within MERCOSUR. Provided 
that governments do not excessively interfere and limit the continuity of 
the process, the trend towards integration is set and is being maintained. 
32. Thomas Babington & Baron Macaulay, History of England, in THE WORKS OF LoRD 
MACAU LA Y (Lady Trevelyan ed., 2d ed., 1871). 
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